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Abstract: The collapse of so many AAA-rated structured …nance products in 2007-2008
has brought renewed attention to the causes of ratings failures and the con‡icts of interest
in the Credit Ratings Industry. We provide a model of competition among Credit Ratings
Agencies (CRAs) in which there are three possible sources of con‡icts: 1) the CRA con‡ict
of interest of understating credit risk to attract more business; 2) the ability of issuers
to purchase only the most favorable ratings; and 3) the trusting nature of some investor
clienteles who may take ratings at face value. We show that when combined, these give rise
to three fundamental equilibrium distortions. First, competition among CRAs can reduce
market e¢ciency, as competition facilitates ratings shopping by issuers. Second, CRAs are
more prone to in‡ate ratings in boom times, when there are more trusting investors, and
when the risks of failure which could damage CRA reputation are lower. Third, the industry
practice of tranching of structured products distorts market e¢ciency as its role is to deceive
trusting investors. We argue that regulatory intervention requiring: i) upfront payments
for rating services (before CRAs propose a rating to the issuer), ii) mandatory disclosure of
any rating produced by CRAs, and iii) oversight of ratings methodology can substantially
mitigate ratings in‡ation and promote e¢ciency.
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“[The investment] could be structured by cows and we would rate it”
- Analyst at one of the main credit rating agencies in an e-mail referring to structured
…nance products, April 5, 20071
The analyst in the above statement refers to a key dilemma for credit rating agencies:
how should they act when their principal source of revenue comes from the …rms whose
products they are rating? This potential source of con‡ict has repeatedly been brought
to the public’s [and regulators’] attention, in particular following the East Asian Financial
Crisis (1997), and in the aftermath of the failures of Enron (2001) and Worldcom (2002), but
it has never been so salient as in the recent …nancial crisis. Indeed, while credit rating agency
(CRA) pro…ts exploded with the growth of structured …nance products (Moody’s pro…ts, for
example, tripled between 2002 and 20062), the large number of downgrades of these securities
from 2007 onwards fostered suspicion that ratings standards had been relaxed during the
boom years. Along with these allegations of possible con‡icts of interest for CRAs, many
commentators have also reproved (institutional) bond investors for their excessive reliance
on ratings, and for not doing their homework in independently assessing default risk. The
combination of the CRA reliance on fees from issuers, investors who were too trusting, and
issuers looking to bene…t from the mispricing of their issues could have led to substantial
ratings in‡ation.
In this paper, we combine these elements in a model of credit ratings and CRA com-
petition to analyze the equilibrium outcome of ratings and the e¢ciency consequences of
possible equilibrium ratings in‡ation. The model gives rise to three fundamental equilib-
rium distortions. First, competition among CRAs may reduce market e¢ciency since it
facilitates ratings shopping by issuers and results in excessively high reported ratings. We
show in particular that, as a result of issuer shopping, e¢ciency may be higher under a
monopoly CRA than under a duopoly despite the potential for the increased informative-
ness of two ratings. Second, CRAs are more prone to in‡ate ratings in boom times, when
there is a larger clientele of investors in the market who take ratings at face value, and when
the risks of failure which could damage CRA reputation are lower. Third, we show that for
structured products the practice of tranching and “rating at the edge” results in an e¢ciency
loss, as it only serves the purpose of deceiving investors who take ratings at face value.
Thus, the key building blocks of our model are:
² Issuer payments for ratings: In practice, CRA fees involve both a fee at the time
of issuance and an annual fee for as long as the issue is outstanding. Importantly,
while CRAs have list price schedules, they may renegotiate fees with regular customers
1United States Securities and Exchange Commission (2008), p.12.
2"Triple-A-Failure," by Roger Lowenstein, New York Times Magazine, April 27, 2008. Moody’s pro…ts
are the easiest of the CRAs to measure since they are a public stand-alone company. "Moody’s operating
margins exceeded 50 percent for the past six years, three to four times those of Exxon Mobil Corp., the
world’s biggest oil company"."Bringing Down Wall Street as Ratings Let Loose Subprime Scourge," by
Elliot Blair Smith, www.bloomberg.com, Sept 24, 2008.
1(White (2002)).3 In addition, CRAs o¤er related consulting services, such as pre-rating
assessments.
² Issuer shopping for ratings: In practice, as in our model, an issuer pays a CRA only
if it asks the CRA to make the rating public.4 Also, if an issuer is unhappy with a
rating, it may solicit another one.5
² CRA credit models may vary in precision: We consider CRA credit-risk models that
provide imperfect assessments of default risk. As Deven Sharma, president of S&P,
declared: “Events have demonstrated that the historical data we used and the as-
sumptions we made signi…cantly underestimated the severity of what has actually
occurred”.6
² CRAs can make ‘adjustments’ to their credit-risk model outputs: As Gri¢n and Tang
(2009) show in their study of credit ratings of structured products, CRAs used noisy
credit-risk models, to which they made frequent adjustments before determining the
…nal rating. Importantly for our analysis, they show that these adjustments tended to
shift the rating upwards relative to the model-predicted rating.
² Reputation concerns for CRAs: As rating agencies executives often argue, CRAs are
concerned with maintaining their reputation for providing timely and accurate assess-
ments of (changes in) default risk. Accordingly, we introduce in our model a reputation
cost CRAs incur in the event that an issue they rated highly ends up in default. Short
term gains from in‡ating an issue’s quality can thus be smaller in our model than long
term reputation losses from jaded investors.
² Barriers to entry in the credit rating industry: We con…ne our analysis to competition
between two CRAs. However, it is possible but somewhat tedious to extend our analysis
to the case of three CRAs, which is broadly the current market structure in the credit
rating industry. This high concentration of CRAs is a re‡ection of large barriers to
entry into this industry. One ‘arti…cial’ barrier has been established by the SEC, which
created the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) category in
1975, to designate CRAs whose ratings were recognized as being valuable for investment
decisions. Although seven …rms initially had this designation, mergers brought this
down to three (Standard & Poor, Moody’s, and Fitch) and the SEC did not admit
new …rms until recently.7 Since Congress, local governments, and regulatory agencies
adopted this designation, this has according to White (2002) resulted in an “absolute
3The SEC found that in a sample of subprime RMBS deals, 12 arrangers represented 80% of the business
in both number and dollar volume, while for CDOs of subprime deals, 11 arrangers accounted for 92% of
the deals and 80% of the dollar volume. (SEC (2008) p.32).
4“Typically the rating agency is paid only if the credit rating is issued”. SEC (2008), p.9.
5“Brian Clarkson, then president and chief operating o¢cer of Moody’s Investor’s Service acknowledged
that, ‘There is a lot of rating shopping that goes on...What the market doesn’t know is who’s seen certain
transactions but wasn’t hired to rate those deals.”’ [Bond-Rating Shifts Loom in Settlement; N.Y.’s Cuomo
Plans Overhaul of How Firms Get Paid, Aaron Lucchetti, Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2008.]
6"Testimony before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, United States House of Rep-
resentatives", Deven Sharma, October 22, 2008.
7Until 2003, when the SEC gave Dominion the NRSRO designation. In 2005, A.M. Best received the
designation, and in 2006, 3 more designations were given out (White (2010)).
2barrier to entry”. The extremely high pro…t margins of CRAs are also emblematic of
a highly concentrated industry.
² Sophisticated and ‘trusting’ investor clienteles: Some of the potential investors in rated
issues are sophisticated and understand a CRA’s potential con‡icts of interest; they
are thus able to see through ratings in‡ation. On the other hand, a signi…cant fraction
(which may vary) of investors are trusting, in that they take the CRAs’ ratings at face
value. This coexistence of trusting and sophisticated investors may be due to di¤erent
types of incentives to perform due diligence. Trusting investors, for example, may be
pension fund managers, whose compensation only marginally depends on the ex-post
return of the assets they manage. Moreover, the more complex the investments, the
more costly it may be to uncover their value. Sophisticated investors, on the other
hand, could be hedge funds, whose returns depend more directly on the pro…tability
of the investment. Regulation that forces managers to only purchase investments with
good ratings could also provide incentives to be trusting. Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits
(2005), in a study of the CRA credit watch mechanism, also model investors who take
ratings at face value, calling them institutional investors. Similarly, Hirshleifer and
Teoh (2003) model investors with “limited attention and processing power”. More
generally, this allows for a rich and subtle interaction between two di¤erent investor
clienteles (which seems of the essence for CRAs) and contributes to the literature on
di¤erences of opinion.8
Incorporating these key features into our model, we demonstrate under what situations
ratings in‡ation is more likely to occur, what its impact is on market e¢ciency, and what
the impact of regulatory proposals is likely to be. Furthermore, we examine empirical im-
plications of the model and evidence from current studies on CRAs and structured …nance
products. We now summarize these points.
Our most important result is that for a broad subset of parameter values a duopoly
ratings industry is less e¢cient than a monopoly. The reason is that, although in a duopoly
investors could obtain more information, the issuer has more opportunities to shop for a good
rating and to take advantage of trusting investors by only purchasing the best ratings. By
extending the model to two periods to allow for endogenous reputation, we further show that
the greater e¢ciency of a monopoly CRA holds for all parameters. This result is consistent
with the …ndings of Becker and Milbourn (2009), who show that the greater competitive
threat posed by Fitch in the corporate bond market coincides with a deterioration in ratings
quality.
CRAs may in‡ate the quality of the issuer’s investment when there are more trusting in-
vestors in the market and/or when CRA expected reputation costs are lower. Thus in boom
times, when more investors are trusting and the probability of getting caught is smaller, more
ratings in‡ation is likely to occur. This result is consistent with the …ndings of Ashcraft,
Goldsmith-Pinkham and Vickrey (2009), who show that ratings of mortgage-backed securi-
ties were least accurate at the peak of the real-estate boom. We also show that more precise
CRA credit-risk models both enhance CRA payo¤s from in‡ating their ratings and increase
their probability of getting caught ex-post, so that their overall e¤ect is ambiguous.
8We provide a somewhat di¤erent (more institution-based) explanation for why di¤erences of opinion
arise (see, Harrison and Kreps, 1978, and Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003).
3We also show that when an issuer is more important to a CRA, either because it is a
repeat issuer or because it has larger issues, the CRA is more prone to in‡ate that issuer’s
ratings. This result is in line with the …ndings of He, Qian and Strahan (2009), who show
that CRAs rated large structured product issuers more favorably, and Faltin-Traeger (2009),
who …nds that repeat issuers are more likely to stick with the same CRA if they received a
more favorable early rating.
Another key result of our analysis is that allowing issuers to restructure their products
is likely to decrease market e¢ciency, as the sole purpose of the restructuring is to be able
to o¤er a better rating to the trusting investor clientele. Sophisticated investors don’t gain
from a restructuring as they are able to price an issue correctly on average, and they simply
ask for a price compensation for holding a riskier issue. Thus, the tranching and credit
enhancement only serves the purpose of making trusting investors comfortable investing in
the issue thanks to a high rating.
Lastly, we analyze reforms to the industry in the context of our model. The Cuomo plan,
which is an agreement between New York State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo and the
three main CRAs, requires that the issuers pay CRAs upfront for their rating, not contingent
on the report. In our model, this plan eliminates the incentives for CRAs to in‡ate ratings,
but does not eliminate shopping. Therefore mandating automatic disclosure of any ratings
solicited is necessary to get rid of the shopping distortion.9 The upfront fees may, however,
undermine CRA incentives to invest in model accuracy and due diligence, making oversight
on methodology potentially important.
While we dedicate section 8 to empirical evidence, we o¤er a summary of the related
theoretical literature below.
1.1 Related Theoretical Literature
There is by now a substantial literature on information intermediaries in both microeco-
nomics and …nance. The paper closest to ours is Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet (2008),
who examine the incentives of a monopoly CRA to in‡ate ratings in a model of endogenous
reputation.10 They …nd that reputation cycles may exist where a CRA builds up its repu-
tation by relaying information accurately only to exploit this reputation later by collecting
fees for in‡ated ratings. They also demonstrate that truthtelling incentives are weaker when
the CRA has more business from rating complex products. While their model endogenizes
reputation, it restricts them to analyzing only a monopolist and to de…ne a complex product
simply as one where the CRA’s reputation is at stake. By making the large assumption that
reputation is exogenous, we are able to examine the e¤ects of competition and include a
wealth of parameters on which we can perform comparative statics. Nevertheless, we endo-
genize reputation in a simple repeated game in section 5 to show that our results are indeed
robust.
In the microeconomics literature, information intermediaries are modeled as engaging
in acquiring and certifying information by committing to disclosure rules, as for example
9This regulation can only address explicit shopping. The implicit shopping problem would remain (see
Sangiorgi et al. 2009).
10Strausz (2005) also models endogenous reputation for information intermediaries. He provides interesting
insights in line with our …ndings, as he argues that honest certi…cation has some of the characteristics of a
natural monopoly.
4in Biglaiser (1993) and Lizzeri (1999). In contrast, credit rating agencies don’t commit to
information disclosure rules and their incentives come from the possible reputation costs
they incur when they provide inaccurate information. This is akin to the issues …nancial
analysts face when they recommend stocks, as analyzed by Benabou and Laroque (1992) and
by Morgan and Stocken (2003). The model of Morgan and Stocken (2003) also addresses the
issue of unveri…able information provision, when the certi…er can lie but thereby incurs a lying
cost (this problem is examined further in Kartik, 2008, Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani,
2007, and Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2006).
Although our signaling game is simpler in some respects, we extend the analysis relative
to this literature by examine how strategic contracting between the informed party (the
CRA) and an interested party (the issuer in our case) can a¤ect information revelation. Our
problem is also related in this respect to the economics literature on strategic contracting
when the information revealed a¤ects a third party, which covers a wide number of mi-
croeconomic issues (see Inderst and Ottaviani, 2008, Durbin and Iyer, 2009, and Mariano,
2008). In Pagano and Volpin (2008), CRAs have no con‡icts of interest, but can choose to
be more or less opaque depending on what the issuer asks for. They show that because of
the existence of a winner’s curse, opacity can enhance liquidity in the primary market but
may cause a market freeze in the secondary market.
In Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2007), we analyze a situation of strategic contracting
where the informed parties (banks) set prices for their products at the same time as pro-
viding recommendations about them to uninformed investors. We show that competition
unambiguously reduces banks’ incentives to oversell their products. Interestingly, this turns
out not to be the case in our model of con‡icts for CRAs. The reason is that CRA ratings are
as likely to be complements as substitutes and issuers may choose to purchase ratings from
both CRAs in equilibrium. Also, the presence of trusting investors distorts CRA incentives
to in‡ate ratings in the same way, whether in a duopoly or a monopoly. In contrast, in
Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2007), information revelation came from the banks’ need to
di¤erentiate their products.
Several related papers have studied other implications of shopping for good ratings.
Faure-Grimaud, Peyrache and Quesada (2006) look at corporate governance ratings in a
market with truthful CRAs and rational investors. They show that issuers may prefer to
suppress their ratings if they are too noisy. They also …nd that competition between rating
agencies can result in less information disclosure. Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) and San-
giorgi, Sokobin and Spatt (2009) also assume that CRAs truthfully relay their information
and demonstrate how noisier information creates more opportunity for shopping by issuers
to take advantage of a naive clientele.
Farhi, Lerner, and Tirole (2010) are concerned with how certi…ers such as rating agencies
or academic journals position themselves with respect to the transparency and coarseness
of their certi…cations. While they allow for heterogeneity among certi…ers, they set aside
reputation e¤ects and the incentives to produce generous ratings or certi…cations. They
examine the strategy of sellers (our issuers) when they face certi…ers that di¤er in their
standards. When a fail for the high level certi…cation is not disclosed, then sellers may opt
…rst for an ambitious certi…cation strategy (approaching certi…ers with higher standards …rst)
provided the non-disclosure of the fail is not transparent. This strategy is related to rating
shopping, as the result in both cases is that market does not observe negative information.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we write down the model and solve the
5case for a single CRA. In Section 3, we analyze the case of competition between two CRAs.
Section 4 compares e¢ciency in the two market structures. Section 5 takes the conclusion
from Section 4 that competition decreases e¢ciency and examines its robustness. Section
6 extends the model to allow for restructuring and tranching the investment. Section 7
investigates di¤erent plans to regulate the credit rating industry. Section 8 lays out empirical
implications of the model and surveys the evidence. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider three types of risk neutral agents: issuers, credit ratings agencies (CRA), and a
mass 1 of investors. Funds from investors are sought by issuers for independent investments
in multiple periods, although we will focus primarily on the analysis of a single issue in the
…rst period.
An investment is characterized by its probability of default: a bad investment defaults
with probability   0, and a good investment defaults with probability zero. Either type of
investment yields the same return  when not in default, and 0 in default11. The investment
has constant returns to scale, so that each unit issued has the same return pro…le.
All agents believe ex-ante that the investment is good with probability 1
2. This creates
a role for the CRA, which can use its technology to …nd out whether the investment is
good or bad. A signal  2 fg which is private information of the CRA has the following
informational content about the true type  of the investment:
Pr( =  j  = ) = Pr( =  j  = ) = 
Pr( =  j  = ) = Pr( =  j  = ) = 1 ¡ 
The variable  measures the quality of the signal received, which we will refer to as the
precision of the signal. At  = 1
2 the signal has revealed no information and agents retain
their ex-ante beliefs. For   1
2, the signal becomes informative. We assume that the level
of precision is known and lies in the interval (1
21).
The CRAs post their fee  at which a rating can be purchased before they receive the
signal. When they are approached by an issuer CRAs proceed to retrieve the signal  and
produce a credit report. After observing the report, the issuer has the choice whether to pay
 to have the CRA’s proposed rating distributed, or to refuse to purchase it. In other words,
we allow the issuer to “shop” for ratings. This timing is meant to capture in a simple way
the back and forth negotiations that often go on when CRAs make their ratings reports.12 If
the issuer shops and refuses to buy the CRA’s report, that in itself is a signal, which conveys
information to investors.
The published rating is a message or report of  =  (“Good”) or  =  (“Bad”) that
is observable to investors. Once the rating is announced, or if it is not announced due to the
issuer’s refusal to purchase it, the issuer sets a uniform price  for the investment. Since the
cost of production of the investment is normalized to zero, we can interpret the price  as a
11In the working paper version of this model, we allowed for a positive recovery value conditional on default
and all of the same results hold, so we have chosen this speci…cation for expositional purposes.
12We don’t allow for unsolicited ratings. These ratings are extremely rare in practice (see, Sangiorgi et
al., 2009). We do, however, analyze the process of altering a structured …nancial product in section 6.
6spread. Investors, after observing the rating and the price , …nally decide how much of the
investment to purchase.
There are two types of investors, sophisticated and trusting. A fraction 1¡ of investors
is sophisticated. These investors observe the payo¤s of the game for both the CRA and the
issuer, and therefore understand the CRA’s and issuer’s potential con‡ict of interest. They
do not know, however, whether the investment is good or bad, as they do not observe the
signal of the CRA and they only have access to the CRA’s report. Trusting investors assume
that CRAs always truthfully rate the investment and therefore take CRAs’ ratings at face
value. Also, when they don’t observe a rating these investors simply retain their ex-ante
beliefs. Sophisticated investors, on the other hand, rationally update their beliefs.
One way to motivate the coexistence of trusting and sophisticated investors is to observe
that di¤erent types of investors have di¤erent incentives to perform due diligence. Trust-
ing investors may be managing third party investments and their pay may only depend
marginally upon the realized return of the assets they manage13. Sophisticated investors’
incentives on the other hand may be investing their personal funds or their pay may be more
closely tied to realized returns.
If investors …nd out that a CRA in‡ated its rating, they punish the CRA in future periods
by ignoring its reports. At the time the rating is issued, however, investors cannot determine
whether the rating is truthful or not. More formally, they cannot determine whether the
rating  2 fg is equal to the signal received by the CRA  2 fg. But they are able
to …nd out ex-post whether the CRA lied in the event of a default. In practice it is di¢cult
to determine whether a CRA misled investors even ex-post. Still, it is generally easier to
make that determination ex-post rather than ex-ante. To simplify the analysis we make the
somewhat extreme assumption that investors can perfectly identify whether the CRA lied
in the event of a default.14
Hence, if the CRA receives a signal  =  and reports  = , then if the investment
fails the CRA will not be punished, as investors can see that it acted in good faith. However,
a CRA who receives a signal  =  and reports  =  will be punished if the project fails.
Reputation costs create an incentive for CRAs to tell the truth, since investors can eventually
learn and punish the CRA. We denote the reputation cost by . This is the discounted sum of
future CRA pro…ts, which are available when the CRA is not caught lying.15 To simplify the
analysis we follow Morgan and Stocken (2003), Ottaviani and Sorensen (2008), and Bolton,
Freixas, and Shapiro (2007) by assuming that reputation costs are exogenously given. This
allows us, in particular, to explore policy implications in a tractable manner.
For tractability, we also assume that the reputation  at stake is slightly noisy:
13Regulation that forces managers to only purchase investments with good ratings could also provide these
incentives. Lower incentives to perform due diligence could also be exacerbated by investments which are
more complex and di¢cult to value.
14Formally we can motivate this assumption by assuming that the recovery value in default is a random
variable and even though the expected value is normalized to 0, the realizations di¤er depending on the
signal  observed by the CRA ex-ante. The economic idea here is that the issuer also gets a noisy signal 
ex-ante and takes greater precautions to salvage some recovery value when  =  than when  = .
15This punishment may be more likely in the case of newer …nancial instruments like structured …nance
products where demand for the product may dry up. From a broader perspective, the punishment imposed
may be from a change in the regulatory environment due to public outcry, such as enforcing liability claims.
Lastly, although something similar has not occurred in the recent crisis, the downfall of Arthur Andersen
represents a severe punishment to a certi…cation intermediary.
7Assumption A0: There is a tiny amount of uncertainty on the part of the CRA about
the actual value of , i.e.  2 [~  ¡ ~  + ] such that  ! 0. This uncertainty is resolved
when the CRA receives its signal.
This assumption restricts the CRA’s strategy space since for any small amount of uncer-
tainty, however small, it will be unable to set fees exactly at levels to make itself indi¤erent
between reports. Thus, this small uncertainty limits the CRA to pure strategies.
Investors can either purchase 1 unit or 2 units of the investment. We assume that they
have a reservation utility that is increasing in the size of their investment, speci…cally they
need a return of  on the …rst unit of their investment and a return of  on the second unit,
where   .16 One may think of this in several ways: it could be an investor holding her
money in cash and needing a larger return to invest all of it, a need for a higher return in
order to commit to only one investment vehicle and not diversify, or a form of risk aversion.
We make the following assumptions on the returns on investment:
(1 ¡ )   (A1)




)   (A3)
Assumption A1 says that an investor who knows the investment is bad is willing to purchase
1 unit. Assumption A2 says that an investor with reliable information that the investment
is good is willing to purchase 2 units. The information problem is explicit in assumption A3:
not knowing whether an investment is good or bad (and evaluating the investment with the
ex-ante beliefs), an investor is not willing to purchase 2 units. This implies that if the CRA
did not exist, the issuer would not be able to sell 2 units to any investor since the probability
that the issue is bad is too large. The CRA can therefore potentially improve market
e¢ciency by providing information. These assumptions are standard17 and are necessary to
create a value enhancing role for CRAs through information provision.
To simplify our expressions for payo¤s, we introduce the following notation:

 = (1 ¡ (1 ¡ )) ¡ 

 = (1 ¡ ) ¡ 





The terms   and   represent the marginal value18 to sophisticated investors when the
CRA truthfully reports  =  and  = , respectively. They also represent the marginal
16The speci…c form the reservation utility takes could be modeled in multiple ways and give the same
results, this form is chosen for simplicity.
17For example, Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009) assume that in the absence of a CRA the invest-
ment will not be purchased, and the CRA can improve market e¢ciency by providing information about
which investments are good.
18We de…ne the marginal value   with respect to the …rst unit of investment and its reservation value 
because investors will only purchase one unit of a bad investment. We de…ne the marginal value   with
respect to the second unit of investment and its reservation value  because investors will purchase two units
of an investment they believe to be good and since issuers are assumed to use uniform pricing the price must
be based on the marginal unit.
8value to trusting investors when the CRA reports  =  and  = , whether truthfully
or not. The term  0 is the marginal value to investors who maintain their ex-ante beliefs
about the value of the investment.
2.1 The Ratings Game with a single CRA
We begin by examining the game with a monopoly CRA. The timing of moves in this game
is as follows:
1. The CRA posts its fee .
2. The CRA receives the signal and then makes a report of  =  or  = .
3. The issuer observes the report and decides whether to buy and distribute it or not.
The issuer then sets a price  for a unit of the investment.
4. Investors observe the price  and the CRA rating, if there is any, and decide how much
of the investment to purchase.
5. The investment return is realized.
When the monopoly CRA receives a signal it must decide what to report. The issuer
must decide whether to purchase the report, and subsequently how much to charge investors.
Sophisticated investors must infer how good the investment is and formulate their willingness
to pay19. We solve the game backwards, beginning with the CRA decision of what report to
issue after observing the signal.
Lemma 1 Given the fee , the CRA’s reporting strategy is:
1. For   , the CRA in‡ates ratings (always reports G)
2. For 0    , the CRA reports the truth, relaying its signal perfectly.
The proof is in the appendix.
When the CRA o¤ers a  rating, the issuer responds by not purchasing this rating, as it
only decreases investor valuations. The CRA therefore only obtains the fee  when it o¤ers
the  rating. There are thus two possible reporting regimes, one where the CRA in‡ates
the investment quality (when the fee is larger than the expected reputation cost) and one
where the CRA truthfully reveals the investment quality (when the fee is smaller than the
expected reputation cost).
We proceed next to derive the equilibrium fees the CRA sets under each informational
regime.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium of the fee setting game is:
19There are situations where the report ‘Bad’ ( = ) is o¤ the equilibrium path. As we employ the
concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, there is no restriction on o¤-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. However,
we shall restrict attention to equilibria where o¤ the equilibrium path beliefs are equal to ex-ante beliefs
(that is, the investment is expected to be good with probability 1
2).
91. If 2  ¡  0  , the CRA in‡ates ratings, sets  = 2  ¡  0 and has pro…ts
2
 ¡ 












The proof is in the appendix.
The proposition establishes that the CRA maximizes its pro…ts by choosing ratings in-
‡ation over truthtelling whenever the pro…ts from ratings in‡ation (2  ¡  0) are larger
than the expected reputation cost .20 Overstating the quality of the investment is an
equilibrium outcome, despite the presence of reputation costs. This is also a point that
Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2008) make.
The cuto¤ 2  ¡  0 ¡  determines whether the CRA in‡ates the quality of the
investment. Thus, when reputation costs are smaller and the size of the trusting audience
larger, the CRA is more likely to take advantage of trusting investors by in‡ating ratings.
Conversely, when reputation costs are larger and the size of the sophisticated audience larger,
the CRA is more likely to tell the truth and create information for all investors. This suggests
that ratings in‡ation is more likely in boom times when investors have lower incentives to
perform due diligence, as the ex-ante quality of investments is then higher. Note also that an
increase in the precision of the signal  has competing e¤ects. It raises the expected valuation
of trusting investors, giving higher short term returns to the CRA. On the other hand, it also
increases the likelihood that the CRA gets caught if it misled investors, decreasing future
returns.
3 Competition among Ratings Agencies
We next examine the game where two ratings agencies compete in selling ratings to issuers.
The CRAs can be thought of as having di¤erentiated products since they are receiving
imperfect (  1) signals about the quality of the investment. In addition, more than one
CRA rating may be purchased to provide maximum information. The timing of the game
with competition is similar to the game with one CRA:
1. Each CRA posts a fee , where  = 12 represents the …rm.
2. The CRAs receive their signals and produce reports of  =  or  = ,
3. The issuer observes the reports and decides whether to purchase and distribute one,
both, or neither report. It then sets a price  per unit of the investment,
4. Investors observe the report(s) purchased by the issuer and decide how much of the
investment to purchase,
20The fee 2  ¡  0 represents selling 2 units of the investment to each trusting investor, who believes
the  rating. This fee must subtract o¤  0, because the issuer must be compensated for deciding to do
business with the CRA, rather than sell to investors with ex-ante valuations.
105. The return is realized.
Again to simplify our expressions for payo¤s, we adopt the following notation:

 = (1 ¡
(1 ¡ )2
(1 ¡ )2 + 2) ¡ 

 = (1 ¡
2
(1 ¡ )2 + 2) ¡ 
The terms   and   represent the marginal value to sophisticated investors when
both CRAs truthfully report  =  and  = , respectively. They also represent the
marginal value to trusting investors when both CRAs report  =  and  = , respectively,
whether truthfully or not. The marginal value to trusting investors when one CRA reports
 =  and the other reports  =  is  0, the ex-ante marginal value before any information
is obtained about the investment.
To simplify the analysis, we make the following assumption about the marginal value of






This means that the value of the …rst  report for trusting investors is larger than the value of
a second  report for all investors. This assumption is a way of expressing decreasing returns
to  reports. It is slightly stronger than standard decreasing returns. This assumption is
always satis…ed if the precision  is su¢ciently high (close to one) or su¢ciently low (close
to one-half) as in those cases,   =  .








This condition guarantees existence of the truthtelling equilibrium by preventing one
CRA from unilaterally deviating to in‡ating its ratings and catering only to trusting cus-
tomers. If this condition did not hold, there would be less truthtelling in duopoly, which





 0  (A6)
This is not critical to the results at all, but simpli…es the exposition22.
21Without A4, there can still be equilibria where both CRAs tell the truth and equilibria where both
CRAs always report G (and there would be no equilibria where one CRA tells the truth and one always
reports ). However, there would be multiple equilibria for each informational regime, there would need
to be another restriction on parameters to guarantee existence, and both types of equilibria could co-exist.
Assumption A4 also places a lower bound on , which means some shopping will always occur. This plays
a role in our analysis of market e¢ciency.
22Assumption (A6) …xes the cuto¤s for which shopping will occur. When there are two  reports the
issuer must decide between charging  0 to trusting investors or   to everyone. There is then a cuto¤
 
 0 for  such that it is best to target trusting investors for  higher than this cuto¤ (when there are two
 reports), i.e. max[ 0 ] =  0. This will be relevant in the proposition below and in the section on
market e¢ciency.
11We denote the discounted sum of future pro…ts in a duopoly for each CRA if it is not
caught lying by . Again this is an exogenous variable as in the case of monopoly.23 As
before, we solve the game backwards, beginning with the decision of what report to issue
after observing the signal.
Lemma 2 For a given set of fees for both CRAs, CRA ’s reporting strategy is:
1. If   , the CRA in‡ates ratings (always reports ).
2. If   , the CRA reports the truth, relaying its signal perfectly.
The proof is the same as that of Lemma 1. We next solve for the equilibrium of the fee
setting game.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium of the fee setting subgame (assuming A4-A6 hold) is:
1. If 2( ¡ )  , both CRAs always report ,  = 2( ¡ ) for  = 12
with CRA pro…ts given by
2(
 ¡ 





2. If 2(  ¡  )  , both CRAs report truthfully,  = min[2(  ¡  )]






The proof is in the appendix.
There are thus two possible equilibria: one where both CRAs always in‡ate the quality
of the investment, and one where both CRAs reveal truthfully their information about the
investment. The cuto¤ determining which equilibrium prevails is whether the current payo¤
from in‡ating ratings 2(  ¡  ) is larger or smaller than the expected cost of getting
caught .
In general, with a larger fraction of sophisticated investors and a larger reputation cost
there will be more truthtelling. An increase in the precision of the signal, however, creates
a trade-o¤. The probability of getting caught is rising in the precision, making truthtelling
more likely. But, the current payo¤ from manipulating (2( ¡ )) is increasing for low
precision levels, meaning that truthtelling is less likely. However, in contrast to the case of
monopoly, for high precision levels the current payo¤ is decreasing in the precision, meaning
that current and future incentives are aligned in making truthtelling more likely.
23Note that this is a stronger assumption, since with two CRAs it might be that should one CRA be
caught lying, the other CRA gets larger continuation pro…ts. It might also be that a CRA only gets caught
if it is lying and the other CRA is telling the truth (Stolper, 2009 examines this type of reputation in a game
where a regulator is actively monitoring and punishing CRAs). Alternatively, it might be that both CRAs
(the whole industry) get punished when any CRA is caught. Furthermore, there may be an added di¤erence
between monopoly and duopoly in the sense that when a monopoly CRA gets caught, there is nowhere to
turn to, while when a duopoly CRA gets caught, there is a reasonable alternative (the other CRA). This
approach is taken in the context of …rms selling goods of varying qualities in Hörner (2002).
12Comparing the outcome under competition to the case of a monopoly CRA – where
the cuto¤ for truthtelling is whether 2  ¡  0 ¡  is larger than zero or not – we …nd
that, as the marginal value of a CRA positive report is decreasing, the payo¤ to in‡ating
ratings is larger in a monopoly. Still, it is likely that   , since the expected loss of
business should be larger in monopoly, which may mitigate the increase in fees available to
the monopolist. Note, however, that if trusting investors were to overestimate the precision
of the CRAs’ reports, the incentive to in‡ate would be very strong irrespective of market
structure (current payo¤s increase, future costs don’t change). Ashcraft and Schuermann
(2008) support the idea of overestimation, “Credit ratings were assigned to subprime MBS
with signi…cant error. Even though the rating agencies publicly disclosed their rating criteria
for subprime, investors lacked the ability to evaluate the e¢cacy of these models.” Lastly, if
we de…ne shopping as taking place when there are less than two  signals (Pr(Shopping) = 1-
Pr(two  signals)), we …nd that shopping increases in duopoly when precision decreases24.
Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) also point out that less precise signals imply more ratings
shopping by issuers.
4 Market E¢ciency
We now turn to the evaluation of the e¢ciency of equilibrium outcomes. Note that in our
model it is not completely obvious what the relevant e¢ciency benchmark is, as we have
a fraction of investors who are trusting. We consider total ex-ante surplus,25 evaluating
expected surplus for all agents from the point of view of a sophisticated agent, thus adopting
a paternalistic point of view. In other words we take the view that one role of …nancial
regulation is to protect trusting investors from mistakes they may make based on faulty
information. The main motivation for this view is that trusting investors would support
such regulations with the bene…t of hindsight once their naivete is exposed.
We begin by establishing two benchmarks for total surplus, the …rst best and the market
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The top expression is given by the probability that the investment is good multiplied by
the surplus created when investors purchase two units plus the probability the investment is
bad multiplied by the surplus when only one unit is purchased.
24As Calomiris (2008) has argued: “Subprime was a relatively new product, [] Given the recent origins
of the subprime maket which postdates tle last housing cycle downturn in the U.S. (1989-1991), how were
the rating agencies able to ascertain what the LGD would be on a subprime mortgage pool?” Thus the
lower precision of CRA’s information about subprime credit risk may have been a source of ratings in‡ation
through greater shopping pressure by issuers. Charles Calomiris, (2008), The subprime turmoil: What’s old,
what’s new, and what’s next. Vox: http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1561
25In a previous version of the paper, we also used investor surplus to evaluate market e¢ciency. The
results were the same when comparing truthtelling regimes, but stronger when comparing ratings in‡ation
regimes (duopoly had strictly lower investor surplus than monopoly).
13The market solution when there are no CRAs (subscript 0) is just given by
0 = 
0
since both trusting and sophisticated investors would then only purchase one unit. Therefore
the maximum surplus that can be gained through the provision of credit ratings is given by
1
2( ¡ ), the extra unit purchased when the investment is good.
We now analyze the total surplus in each regime for both monopoly and duopoly. In the
total surplus calculations we add the surplus of investors, credit rating agencies and issuers.
The fees of credit rating agencies and the prices charged by issuers net out. Note also that we
exclude future surplus from our welfare calculations and look only at e¢ciency in the short
run, as our reputation parameters  and  are exogenous. Finally, note that assumption A4
implies that 2  ¡  0  0, or    0
2 . We therefore examine total surplus (and investor
surplus) only for the interval  2 [  0
2 1].
1. Monopoly CRA, ratings in‡ation regime (2  ¡  0  ):
Only trusting investors purchase at the high prices, as the rating reveals no positive
information to sophisticated investors. Since trusting investors believe the investment





0 +  ¡ )] (1)
(where the subscript  refers to the monopoly and superscript  refers to the fact
that the CRA always reports ).
This expression is positive, although it may be quite small. The …rst term in the
expression in square brackets is our market solution when there are no CRAs and is
positive, while the second term is negative by A3. Hence, as intuition suggests, the
presence of a credit rating agency reduces surplus in this scenario.
2. Monopoly CRA, truthtelling regime (2  ¡  0  ):
There are two subcases here, depending on how the issuer prices the investment when
there is no report (interpreted correctly by sophisticated investors as a  report that
was not purchased). First, when  0    the issuer optimally sets its price low







As expected, the surplus is higher than when there is no CRA as    0 by assumption
A2. As the precision approaches  = 1, the surplus approaches the …rst best.
When  0   , there is an additional distortion, because the issuer then sets its
price high (when there is no report) to cater only to trusting investors. In this subcase,











143. Duopoly, ratings in‡ation regime (2(  ¡  )  ):
Total surplus here is exactly the same as when there is a monopoly CRA who always
reports . Trusting investors purchase 2 units and sophisticated investors purchase
nothing. The split of rents between CRAs and the issuer, however, is di¤erent here, as
the issuer can earn more than  0 per investor due to competition. If there is a …xed
operating cost for CRAs, this would be less e¢cient than the case of a monopoly CRA.
Both an in‡ating monopoly and an in‡ating duopoly are less e¢cient than a market
without CRAs.
4. Duopoly, truthtelling regime (2(  ¡  )  ):
When  2 [  0
2   
 0 ], the issuer sets the price so as to cater to both types of investor
when there is no report. Total surplus then equals:
1 = (






2 ¡ (1 ¡ )
2)( ¡ ) (4)
+(2(1 ¡ ) + (1 ¡ )
2)(
0 +  ¡ )
In contrast, when the fraction of trusting investors is large ( 2 [ 
 0 1]) and when
there are no  reports the issuer sets a high price at which only trusting investors
purchase. Trusting investors are also the only ones to purchase when there is only one
 report. Thus, the total surplus is the same as in equation (4), minus the surplus lost
from the fact that the issuer targets only trusting investors:
2 = (
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2( ¡ ) + 
2((1 ¡ ) ¡ )]
Comparing these expressions for total surplus we …nd a surprising result: truthtelling
in duopoly yields a lower surplus than truthtelling in monopoly. We establish this in the
following proposition:
Proposition 3 Given Assumptions A0-A6, a truthtelling monopoly strictly dominates a
truthtelling duopoly.
The proof is in the appendix.
A duopoly is less e¢cient because there are more opportunities for the issuer to take
advantage of trusting investors. This can occur when one CRA reports  and one reports
, or when both report . In contrast, under a monopoly CRA there is only the opportunity
to shop when the monopoly CRA reports . As a result, issuers set high prices that exclude
sophisticated investors from the market when, from an e¢ciency perspective, they should
be participating. Also, the additional information of the second report is wasted. This is
predicated on the fact that assumption A4 places a lower bound on the number of trusting
investors, since clearly shopping doesn’t occur when all investors are sophisticated.
When this result is coupled with the fact that a duopoly is as e¢cient as a monopoly when
both are in‡ating the quality of the investment (and less e¢cient if we consider operating
15costs), this suggests that competition among information intermediaries may be detrimental
when shopping is allowed. More formally, conditional on being in the same informational
regime, monopoly increases total surplus. Therefore, policy proposals encouraging entry may
not be the best methods to increase e¢ciency. This is in line with the evidence presented
in Becker and Milbourn (2009), who document less accurate ratings in the corporate bond
market due to more competition from Fitch.
5 Robustness: are there any bene…ts to competition?
Our result that competition among CRAs reduces market e¢ciency is obtained by comparing
outcomes under a monopoly and duopoly for the same informational regime, speci…cally when
either both monopoly and duopoly CRAs in‡ate ratings, or when both truthfully disclose
their signals. A natural question then is whether there can be any bene…ts to competition
when the informational regime di¤ers across market structures. We address this question,
and also examine another related robustness issue with respect to endogenizing reputation
costs in this section.
Consider …rst the comparison of monopoly and duopoly under di¤erent information
regimes. It is easy to see that a truthtelling monopoly not only dominates a truthtelling
duopoly but also a duopoly in which CRAs in‡ate ratings. But does a monopoly CRA that
in‡ates ratings dominate a truthtelling duopoly? The next lemma establishes that this is
not the case.
Lemma 3 Total surplus for a truthtelling duopoly is larger than that of a monopoly CRA
who in‡ates ratings.
The proof is in the appendix.
This lemma underscores the harmful e¤ects of CRA ratings in‡ation relative to issuer
shopping. The parameters for which both scenarios can occur simultaneously depend on the
intersection of the following two inequalities:
1. 2(  ¡  )  , which guarantees that CRAs in a duopoly prefer to rate
truthfully, and
2. 2  ¡  0  , which ensures that a monopoly CRA prefers to in‡ate ratings to
attract more issuers.
Note …rst that these inequalities can only hold in both market structures if the measure
 of trusting investors is small. Otherwise, the …nancial rewards for CRAs from in‡ating
their ratings and overselling the issue to trusting investors are just too high. Note, moreover,
that truthtelling in the duopoly is more likely when the informational value of a second rat-
ing is low (  close to  ). Thus, somewhat paradoxically, a CRA duopoly dominates a
monopoly only in situations when the marginal value of a second CRA is small. Finally, note
that even when a duopoly dominates a monopoly, this does not imply that competition is ef-
…cient, as the negative e¤ects from issuer shopping remain. It is straightforward to show that
reducing competition to create a regulated duopoly, in which issuers are required to purchase
16a rating from both CRAs, would be welfare superior to an unregulated duopoly.26 Indeed,
under such a regulation: i) CRAs would always strictly prefer to rate truthfully, as the pur-
chase of their rating is then no longer contingent on its content; ii) issuer shopping would be
eliminated; and, iii) issues would be rated based on the maximum available information. In
fact, without the CRA con‡ict of interest and issuer shopping, total surplus would be equal
to the …rst-best (constrained, of course, by the precision of the CRAs’ information).27
The other major robustness issue we explore is how our analysis is modi…ed if reputation
costs are endogenized in a fully speci…ed dynamic model. The endogenous reputation cost
from being caught in‡ating ratings is the cost in foregone future ratings sales. The simplest
way of extending our model to allow for such an endogenous reputation cost is to consider
a two-period version, in which the payo¤ weight attached to the second period is given by
a parameter  (as, for example, in La¤ont and Tirole, 1993), where  may be larger than
1. The size of the parameter  then represents the importance of future relative to current
pro…ts for the CRAs. Thus, for example, at the onset of an issuance boom, future capitalized
CRA pro…ts are likely to be large, so that  is large. In contrast, at the end of an issuance
boom and at the onset of a recession  is small.
Consider …rst the situation of a monopoly CRA. The simpli…cation obtained from the
two-period formulation is that we can solve the game backwards starting from the second
period (taking as given that the CRA has not been caught in‡ating ratings in the …rst period).
As the second period is the last period, there are no more reputation concerns that discipline
the CRA, so that the CRA always in‡ates its ratings. From A4, we know 2  ¡  0  0,
so that the CRA’s optimal policy in the second period is to sell the overrated issue only to
trusting investors and thus realize a positive pro…t of 2  ¡  0. In period 1, endogenous
reputation costs from foregone future pro…ts are then given by  = (2  ¡  0). With











This simple analysis of the dynamic CRA monopoly thus reveals that with endogenous
reputation costs a CRA is more likely to engage in ratings in‡ation when future pro…ts
matter less, as towards the end of an issuance boom. This is consistent with both the
theoretical results of Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009) and the empirical …ndings of
Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham and Vickery (2009).
Consider next the situation of a duopoly CRA. Once again, the two CRAs in‡ate ratings
in period 2, as there are no costs in being caught in‡ating ratings. Each CRA’s best response
in the second period is to sell the overrated issue only to trusting investors and thus realize a
positive pro…t of 2( ¡ ). In period 1 then, endogenous reputation costs from foregone
future pro…ts are given by  = 2(  ¡  ). In period 1 a CRA duopoly that in‡ates






26In the model, this means purchasing from two CRAs. In practice, realistically this would imply pur-
chasing from the big three CRAs (Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch).
27Issuers may lose out under this regulation if CRAs remain free to set prices since, as under a monopoly,






Thus, with endogenous reputation costs, it is the same condition which determines whether
a monopoly CRA or a duopoly CRA will rate truthfully in period 1 or not. In other words, in
our simple dynamic extension with endogenous reputation costs, the equilibrium information
regime is the same across market structures, so that a monopoly always dominates a duopoly
in this situation. This simple analysis, thus, suggests that making reputation endogenous
may well strengthen our e¢ciency results rather than weaken them. It would be of interest
(but beyond the scope of this paper) to explore these issues more systematically in a fully
general dynamic game, possibly with an in…nite horizon. There is currently no model of
oligopolistic competition over an in…nite horizon in the CRA literature; indeed there are very
few such models in the industrial organization literature for obvious reasons of tractability.28
6 Rating Asset-Backed Securities and Structuring to
the Rating
Our analysis so far does not capture an important aspect of the ratings process for struc-
tured …nance products, namely the back and forth negotiations between issuers and CRAs,
and the active structuring of asset-backed securities by issuers. As Fender and Mitchell
(2005), Gorton (2008), Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery, (2009) and Benmelech
and Dlugosz (2009, 2010) among others have highlighted, issuers of structured …nance prod-
ucts could design the default risk of an asset-backed security both by manipulating the risk
characteristics of the asset pool, and by tranching the issue to obtain a higher rating for the
senior tranche. We argue in this section that this strategic structuring activity by issuers
of structured products is another important form of ratings shopping that can give rise to
excessively rosy ratings in equilibrium.
6.1 Equilibrium Tranching and Credit Enhancement
To allow for the issuer’s structuring activity, we extend the model by (i) introducing a new
stage in the credit ratings game following the announcement by the rating agency of a bad
rating and (ii) enriching the CRA rating technology. In the new stage, we give the issuer the
choice to restructure the issue and solicit another rating. De…ne ¤ as the default probability
where an investor’s valuation is the same when she has 1 unit of the investment and 2 units
of the investment:
(1 ¡ 
¤) =  (6)
We enrich the CRA rating technology by allowing it to detect whether investors prefer one
unit (i.e. the probability of default is larger than ¤) or two units (i.e. the probability of
28See Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008) for a review of the literature.
18default is smaller than ¤).29 To keep the analysis of this more complex game as tractable
as possible we also make some simpli…cations, which mainly reduce the number of cases we
need to consider. We now assume that all investors are trusting ( = 1) and that the CRA
obtains a perfectly informative signal about the underlying risk of the issue ( = 1).
Consider …rst the monopoly case. The credit ratings game with restructuring we consider
here is a simple extension of our previous framework:
1. The CRA posts two fees, one for initial ratings 
 and one for rating the product if it
has been restructured 
.30 The issuer follows by deciding whether to seek a rating on
an issue or not.
2. If the issuer decides to seek a rating, the CRA obtains either signal  or . We restrict
attention to the truthtelling regime, formalized in assumption A8 below.31 Therefore,
if the truthfully announced rating is , the issuer responds by purchasing it as long as
the fee 





3. If the rating is  for the unstructured issue, the issuer can now restructure the issue
so as to reduce the probability of default of the senior tranche su¢ciently to get the
CRA to issue a  rating on that tranche. More precisely, the issuer can propose to
split the issue into a senior and a junior tranche, where the probability that the senior
tranche defaults is decreased to . The issuer then holds on to the junior tranche
and enhances the credit quality of the senior tranche. This involves a unit loss for the
issuer of
(1 ¡ ) ¡ (1 ¡ ) = (1 ¡ )
which is equal to the expected value of one unit of the senior tranche minus the expected
value of the original investment. The probability  is a choice variable for the issuer.
4. The CRA responds to a restructured issue by giving a good rating as long as  · ¤,
for then the bene…t of selling a  rating exceeds the expected reputation cost.
The equilibrium best response for the CRA in this game is then to set an initial fee at

 = 2 ¡ 0 for an initial  rating, and a restructuring fee 
 = 2 ¡2(¡¤)¡ 0 for
a  rating on the senior tranche of the restructured issue. And an equilibrium best response
of the issuer is then to purchase the initial  rating at fee 
 when it is o¤ered, to restructure
the issue after an initial  rating so that  =
¤
 , the minimum level needed to get a  rating
on the senior tranche, and to purchase the  rating for the senior tranche at 
.
It is straightforward to verify that the fee 
 is positive (so that restructuring following a
 rating for the unstructured issue will occur) if and only if the following assumption holds:
Assumption A7: 2  ¡ 2( ¡ ¤) ¡  0  0.
29The initial investment is still either good or bad, with respective default probabilities of 0 and . The
rating technology thus is consistent with our previous model. This further elaboration is important for
understanding the situation where restructuring may occur.
30In a previous version, we considered the case of just one fee which would be paid by the issuer each time
it asks for a rating. Two fees is more general and yields the same results.
31There is no need for restructuring in the ratings in‡ation regime.
19To ensure that the CRA does not gain from in‡ating its initial rating in the game with
restructuring we must make sure that   (
 ¡ 
) = 2( ¡ ¤)  0.
Assumption A8:   2( ¡ ¤).
Under these assumptions, the equilibrium outcome of the monopoly credit ratings game
with restructuring is then as described in the proposition below.
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions A0-A3, A7 and A8, the equilibrium tranching and credit
enhancement is such that:
1. Following an initial  rating, the issuer restructures the initial issue by splitting it
into a junior tranche and a senior tranche, where the senior tranche gets a credit
enhancement  such that the probability of default of the senior tranche is reduced
from  to  = ¤.
2. The issuer retains the junior tranche, thereby incurring an expected loss of 2(¡¤).
3. The senior tranche obtains a rating  and is entirely sold to investors.
Consider next the case of a CRA duopoly, where each CRA competes by o¤ering fees
(

) for ratings. It turns out that under our simpli…cations ( = 1 and  = 1) this game
has a straightforward solution and, except for the distribution of surplus, an equilibrium
outcome that is basically the same as under a CRA monopoly. Indeed, with  = 1 both CRAs
have the same information and the marginal value of a second rating is zero:   =  .
This implies that Bertrand competition in fees (

) between the two CRAs will drive the
fees to zero, leaving the entire surplus to the issuer. It then follows from Proposition 2 that
since the CRAs obtain no positive pro…ts from selling ratings, they have a strict preference
for truthfully disclosing their ratings.
The game proceeds as under the game with a monopoly CRA: i) the issuer approaches
one of the two CRAs, and gets a rating. If the rating is , the issuer doesn’t purchase it and
decides to restructure, setting  =
¤
 . It then approaches one of the two CRAs for a new
rating, and receives a rating , which is purchased by investors. While the split of the rents
has changed from monopoly, the information revealed and product sold to investors has not
changed at all.
6.2 The Welfare Costs of Credit Enhancement
Does the ability to restructure an issue and engage in credit enhancement improve e¢ciency?
We provide an unambiguous negative answer to this question in this section. At best, in
an e¢cient capital market where all the actors are rational, credit enhancement neither
adds nor subtracts value. This observation simply follows from straightforward application
of Modigliani-Miller neutrality logic to the asset-backed securities market. Moreover, as
all debt issues bene…t from the same favorable tax treatment of interest payments, there
is no obvious tax bene…t to be obtained from credit enhancement. In practice, as in our
model, credit enhancement and tranching is driven by a preference for high ratings by some
investors, over and above the preference for higher risk-adjusted returns. We model this
preference for higher ratings as arising from a form of investor naivete. But, as we have
20argued, it can also arise from particular institutional arrangements, such as restrictions on
permissible asset classes and compensation practices of pension fund managers.
We compare the total surplus of the game with and without restructuring. Without the
possibility of restructuring an issue, the ex-ante surplus following a  rating is just

 = (1 ¡ ) ¡ 
In contrast, under restructuring following a  rating the total ex-ante surplus is:

 = [(1 ¡ ) ¡ ] + [(1 ¡ ) ¡ ]
The second term is negative given A3. We summarize this discussion in the proposition
below.




[ ¡ (1 ¡ )]
Notice that this result is the same for both monopoly and duopoly. The monopoly CRA
strictly bene…ts from the restructuring since it gets paid 
 and the issuer just breaks even.
The issuer strictly bene…ts from the restructuring and the CRAs just break even in a duopoly.
Either way, the entire e¢ciency loss is borne by trusting investors, who overpay after seeing
the  rating and create wasteful excess demand for the investment. Credit enhancement here
is a socially wasteful activity that only serves the purpose of deceiving trusting investors.
7 Regulating the Credit Ratings Industry
The subprime crisis has brought to light the poor performance of CRAs in rating structured
…nancial products and reminded investors of CRAs’ past poor performance in predicting the
East Asian crisis, the excesses of the dotcom bubble, and the collapse of Enron. Govern-
mental bodies have been debating how to regulate CRAs and some initial rules have been
issued.
In this section we discuss the most prominent proposals in the context of our model. In
our view, the key issues which the proposals seek to address are:
1. eliminating the CRA con‡icts of interest by preventing issuers from in‡uencing ratings
2. preventing issuers from shopping for ratings and disclosing only ratings they prefer,
and
3. monitoring the quality of the ratings methodology.
New York State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo reached an agreement32 with credit
ratings …rms to change some features of the rating process in the summer of 2008. The
agreement between Cuomo and Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch essentially addresses
32The agreement is reportedly for 3 years and on structured …nance products only [Big Credit-Rating
Firms Agree to Reforms, Aaron Lucchetti, Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2008].
21the …rst point, preventing issuers from paying for speci…c ratings and forcing issuers to pay
the CRA upfront before it does its initial analysis.33 This restriction can eliminate ratings
in‡ation by CRAs in our model by eliminating the issuer’s ability to provide incentives for
good ratings34. Importantly, however, it does not eliminate shopping by an issuer; an issuer
may still reach an agreement with a CRA to not publish a bad rating. In our model, issuer
shopping can create distortions even with unbiased CRA ratings due to the trusting nature
of some investors. In a move that also decreases CRA con‡icts of interest, the SEC recently
enacted a rule which prohibits consulting activity related to ratings by CRAs.
Prohibiting shopping by enforcing that CRAs must automatically disclose any rating
that was paid for by an issuer would achieve the …rst best surplus35 in our model when
combined with the Cuomo plan. The SEC currently has a proposed rule that would formalize
this prohibition. Nevertheless, shopping may be di¢cult to eliminate because of informal
discussions between issuers and CRAs that may still take place. This points to a possible
need for auditing by a regulator.
Even by eliminating shopping from the Cuomo plan, there is a risk for an e¢ciency loss
due to moral hazard. Suppose the precision of the signal  were a choice variable of the CRA
and larger precision is more costly. If the CRA can choose this precision after being paid
upfront36 and it is non-contractible then the CRAs would choose the minimum precision of
1
2 and knowing this, the issuer would not hire the CRA in the …rst place. Therefore there
would be a breakdown in the market for certi…cation.
Interestingly, our main model with no regulation shows that adding the observable choice
of precision in monopoly will lead to positive investment by the CRA since the issuer pays
contingent fees. Still, our total surplus calculations show that breakdown of the CRA market
could still be a better outcome than a CRA who in‡ates quality, but worse than an a CRA
who tells the truth. Consequently, it is crucial that the new regulatory structure for CRAs
is accompanied by oversight of minimum analytical standards for the CRAs (and these
standards are set appropriately and could be enforced), so as to regain the bene…cial aspects
summarized above.
One last approach to improving ratings quality lies in enhancing the market’s ability to
punish CRAs. In our model, this would increase the reputation cost, making truthtelling
more likely. The SEC has issued some rules forcing CRAs to disclose their track record,
making their performance more transparent. More importantly, there is a debate within
Congress about whether to make CRAs liable for faulty ratings. CRAs have been "immune
from misstatements under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933" and have won most cases
against them based on the arguments that credit ratings are free speech and are "extensively
disclaimed" (Partnoy (2002)). Therefore eliminating this immunity could impose serious
33There is a …ne point here which is that the deal speci…es upfront payments for initial analysis but does
not prevent subsequent payments. This is obviously an issue, but outside the scope of our model.
34It is of course possible through repeated interactions between an issuer and a CRA to dynamically create
these incentives. This is out of the scope of our analysis, but certainly a caveat.
35While quite intuitive, we prove this formally in a previous working paper version of this paper. An
interesting unintended consequence of eliminating shopping is to reduce the number of ratings, which occurs
because the rents to an extra rating decrease. This is not a complete surprise, as our model demonstrates
that monopoly is more e¢cient than duopoly.
36If precision were not e¤ort in performing the analysis on the investment, but quality of the analytic
models used, then the CRAs would choose larger precision, since it would in essence be chosen before the
fees were paid.
22costs on CRAs for ratings in‡ation.
8 Empirical Implications
This paper demonstrates that competition among CRAs can reduce market e¢ciency due
to the shopping e¤ect and provides a framework for understanding the trade-o¤s in recent
policy proposals regarding the credit rating industry. In this section we examine evidence
surrounding testable implications of the model. We conclude by discussing systematic evi-
dence related to our assumption that investors are trusting.
The model o¤ers several hypotheses for testing:
1. The model shows that poor quality ratings are increasing in the fraction of trusting
investors, current payo¤s, and decreasing in the expected probability of getting caught
(the reputation cost). While it is di¢cult to measure these variables, all three of these
factors are more likely to occur in boom times and less likely to occur in recessions:
when times are good, the probability of defaults are lower, which may decrease due
diligence on the part of investors and also decrease evidence of ratings bias. Moreover,
as a follow-on e¤ect this can increase demand and issuance, generating larger fees for
CRAs. Hence the implication of the model is to examine whether poor ratings quality
is more likely during boom times.
2. As opposed to other theoretical papers, ratings in‡ation can arise in our model purely
due to con‡icts of interest and not shopping. Empirically, we can attempt to exploit
the lack of shopping possibilities in the corporate bond markets to see if con‡icts of
interest (the trade-o¤ between higher current pro…ts and expected future pro…ts) have
some explanatory power. Variables which a¤ect current and future pro…ts, such as the
degree of competition can be related to ratings quality.
3. We show in the section on competition that shopping is more likely when the CRAs’
models are less precise.
4. Shopping is used by issuers to exploit trusting investors. Hence if shopping is occurring,
investors are not taking into account the selection e¤ect. This means that shopping
type behavior causes (i) yields to be more dependent on ratings and (ii) fewer ratings
to imply worse ex-post performance.
We make use of a set of very recent empirical papers focused on CRAs and ratings quality
to examine our hypotheses. In order to do so, we interpret the investment in our model
broadly as applying to both the corporate bond markets and structured …nance products
(indeed, in section 8 we explicitly model the restructuring process). We attempt to point
out where institutional details either bene…t or detract from the model.
The implication that ratings in‡ation is more likely to happen in boom times has been
documented in several recent papers. Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2009a)
…nd that as mortgage backed security issuance volume shoots up in 2005 to mid-2007, ratings
23quality declines. Speci…cally, subordination levels37 for subprime and Alt-A MBS deals
decrease over this time period when conditioning on the overall risk of the deal. Moreover,
subsequent ratings downgrades for the 2005 to mid-2007 cohorts are dramatically larger than
for previous cohorts. Gri¢n and Tang (2009) …nd that CRA adjustments to their models’
predictions of credit risk in the CDO market were positively related to future downgrades.
These adjustments were overwhelmingly positive and the amount adjusted (the width of the
AAA tranche) increases sharply from 2003 to 2007 (from 6% to 18.2%). The adjustments
are not well explained by natural covariates (such as past deals by collateral manager, credit
enhancements, other modeling techniques). Furthermore, 98.6% of the AAA tranches of
CDOs in their sample failed to meet the CRAs’ reported AAA standard (for their sample
from 1997 to 2007). They also …nd that adjustments increase CDO value on average by
$12.58 million per CDO.
On the relationship between current payo¤s and ratings in‡ation, He, Qian, and Strahan
(2009) …nd that MBS tranches sold by larger issuers38 performed signi…cantly worse (market
prices decreased) than those sold by small issuers during the boom period of 2004-2006.
Faltin-Traeger (2009) shows that when one CRA rates more deals for an issuer in a half-year
period than another CRA, the …rst CRA is less likely to be the …rst to downgrade that
issuer’s securities in the next half-year. He also …nds that if a CRA rates a deal higher,
that CRA is more likely to be chosen by the CRA on the issuer’s next deal. This e¤ect is
strongest for Fitch.
Our model isolates two basic causes of poor ratings quality: con‡icts of interest (rat-
ings in‡ation) and shopping. While it is di¢cult to isolate these in reality, an interesting
comparison arises between the corporate bond market and the structured …nance market.
First, in the corporate bond market, S&P and Moody’s rate virtually every rated issue. This
implies there is little scope for shopping there. Nevertheless, our model suggests the trade-
o¤ between current pro…ts and future payo¤ may still in‡uence ratings quality. Becker and
Milbourn (2009) …nd supporting evidence: they show that increases in market share by Fitch
(a proxy for more competition) lead to higher ratings. Moreover, this evidence suggests that
more competition may not be better, even when shopping is not as much of an issue.
Second, the methodology for rating corporate bonds is more standardized and the bonds
themselves are much less complicated than structured …nance products. Our paper sug-
gests shopping is more likely when the CRAs’ models are less precise, which is certainly
the case comparing corporate bonds to structured …nance. Within the structured …nance
arena, Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2009a) …nd that the MBS deals that
were most likely to underperform were ones with more interest-only loans (because of lim-
ited performance history) and lower documentation, i.e. more opaque or di¢cult to evaluate
loans.
Our paper posits that shopping is used by issuers to exploit trusting investors. Regarding
the dependency of yields on ratings, Adelino (2009) shows that AAA tranche yields of MBS
do not have extra predictive power about defaults or subsequent rating downgrades outside
of the rating itself. However, it is not obvious from his results that this got worse during the
37The subordination level they use is the fraction of the deal that is junior to the AAA tranche. A smaller
fraction means that the AAA tranche is less ‘protected’ from defaults, and therefore less costly from the
issuer’s point of view.
38They de…ne larger by market share in terms of deals. As a robustness check, they also look at market
share in terms of dollars and …nd similar results.
24boom (table 12, Adelino (2009)). With respect to less ratings leading to poorer performance,
there is mixed evidence. Gri¢n and Tang (2009) …nd no evidence that CDOs rated by
multiple rating agencies experience less default. Both Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) (for
ABS) and Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2009a) (for RMBS), however, …nd
that ex-post downgrades of structured …nance products are both more likely and larger
in deals rated by a single CRA39. Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2009b), in
preliminary work, …nd that the more issuers switch among CRAs, the lower subordination
is for Alt-A RMBS, indicating bene…ts to shopping around40.
While not a prediction, a key part of the paper is our assumption that a fraction of
investors are trusting. While there is substantial anecdotal evidence for this, we take this
opportunity to describe systematic evidence. There are two views of trusting investors that
explain why they did not perform proper due diligence and analysis. The …rst explains
this using incentive problems, while the second claims the analysis was too complex for
them. While the second is di¢cult to measure, there are two papers in the literature on
corporate bond ratings which demonstrate that ratings were important to some investors
solely for regulatory purposes. Kisgen and Strahan (2009) demonstrate that the acquisition
of NRSRO status for Dominion Bond Rating Service in 2003 changed the impact of its ratings
on bond yields only in situations where this status was important41. Bongaerts, Cremers,
and Goetzmann (2009) …nd that Fitch’s rating were often used to break ties between S&P
and Moody’s.
Focusing on the structured …nance market, Adelino (2009) …nds intriguing evidence of
naivete. He …nds that while initial yields on tranches below AAA predict future credit
performance (probability of default and future ratings downgrades), the initial yields on
AAA tranches had no predictive power. This is consistent with the hypothesis that investors
in AAA tranches had no other information beyond the credit ratings themselves.
9 Conclusion
Our paper contains an analysis of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) and their con‡icts of
interest. The model includes the critical elements of the industry: issuer’s payments may
in‡uence ratings, issuers may shop for ratings, CRA models may vary in precision, barriers
to entry create market power for CRAs, reputation considerations a¤ect decisionmaking, and
di¤erent clienteles for investments exist. This allow us to provide a simple general framework
for the analysis of the rating industry and its e¢ciency that brings a surprising result on the
adverse e¤ects of competition.
We …nd that the presence of more trusting investors or lower reputation costs give CRAs
incentives to in‡ate the quality of investments, while the precision of the CRAs analysis
has dual e¤ects: more precision raises current payo¤s but also increases the probability of
paying a reputation cost. Our analysis of market e¢ciency makes it clear that, in general,
a monopoly is more e¢cient than a duopoly. This is because a duopoly provides more op-
39Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2009) note, however, that only 1% of their deal sample has
just one rating.
40The sign is the same for subprime deals but the coe¢cient is not signi…cant.
41I.e. regulations that required investments to use the best or second best NRSRO rating and speci…cally
around the investment grade threshhold.
25portunities for the issuer to shop and mislead trusting investors. Finally, we demonstrate
that allowing issuers to restructure their investments can further harm investors and reduce
surplus. In terms of regulation, we suggest that upfront fees (as in the Cuomo plan) accom-
panied by enforcing automatic disclosure of ratings and oversight of analytical standards will
minimize distortions from con‡icts of interest and shopping.
To present a closed form model of CRA competition, we have abstracted away from
several aspects of the industry that would be worth analyzing further. We simpli…ed the
ratings process to allow for only two levels of ratings rather than a …ner partition and did
not allow for subsequent upgrades and downgrades that CRAs make while monitoring an
investment. In terms of the investment being issued, we did not model conduits with multiple
assets or make a clear distinction between idiosyncratic and systematic risk. Lastly, while
we did extend the model in section 5 to two periods to endogenize reputation, a model of
CRA competition over a longer time horizon could yield interesting results.
10 Appendix
Lemma 1 Given the fee , the CRA’s reporting strategy is:
1. For   , the CRA in‡ates ratings (always reports G)
2. For 0    , the CRA reports the truth, relaying its signal perfectly.
Proof: Given that the issuer may not purchase after a given report, we will label the fee
 as two di¤erent fees, the fee collected after a “G” report,  (which could be  or zero)
and the fee collected after a “” report,  (which could be  or zero).
Conditional on receiving a good signal, the CRA may report “G”, in which case it earns
( j ) =  + 
It receives a fee  for its report  =  and subsequently earns its full future rent. If the
CRA were to report  =  conditional on receiving a good signal, it would earn
( j ) =  + 
as there is no punishment for having said the investment was bad. Similarly, conditional on
receiving a bad signal, the payo¤ of rating  =  is
( j ) =  + 
Reporting  =  conditional on a bad signal  = , however, yields:
( j ) =  + (1 ¡ )
since now with probability  the investment defaults and the CRA is punished, while with
the complementary probability there is no default and the CRA earns .
Conditional on receiving the good signal, the incentive to report  =  depends on the
di¤erence in payo¤s:
( j ) ¡ ( j ) =  ¡ 
26Conditional on receiving the bad signal, the report to say  =  is:
( j ) ¡ ( j ) =  ¡  + 
This yields three possible information regimes: if ¡  , the CRA always reports
, if 0   ¡   , the CRA reports truthfully, and if  ¡   0, the CRA always
reports .
There is no informational regime where a report of  increases the valuations of sophis-
ticated investors above their ex-ante valuation of  0. Moreover, by assumption, a report of
 decreases the valuations of trusting investors below  0. Therefore, there is no reason for
an issuer to purchase a  report, making the CRA’s return on a  report equal to  = 0.
¥
Proposition 1 The equilibrium of the fee setting game is:
1. If 2  ¡  0  , the CRA in‡ates ratings, sets  = 2  ¡  0 and has pro…ts
2
 ¡ 












Proof: If the CRA always reports  = , the issuer is willing to purchase this rating




the incremental pro…t obtained from trusting investors. There are many beliefs o¤ the equi-
librium path for sophisticated investors such that no deviation will occur. Always reporting




(from Lemma 1) and CRA pro…ts are then
2
 ¡ 




If the CRA reveals its signal truthfully, the  =  report induces the highest valuations
from both trusting and sophisticated investors buying two units, while the  =  report
induces the lowest valuations for sophisticated investors and the ex-ante valuation for trusting





In order to report truthfully, the CRA must respect the limitations given by Lemma 1












Lastly, notice that for 2  ¡  0   both always reporting m=G and truthtelling
are feasible but it is easy to check that the CRA’s pro…ts are higher by always reporting
 = , as the following expression always holds:
2
 ¡ 
0 + (1 ¡

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Proposition 2 The equilibrium of the fee setting subgame (assuming A4-A6 hold) is:
1. If 2(  ¡  )  , both CRAs always report ,  = 2(  ¡  ) for
 = 12 with CRA pro…ts given by
2(
 ¡ 





2. If 2(  ¡ )  , both CRAs report truthfully,  = min[2(  ¡ )]






Proof: First, consider the case where issuers have approached both CRAs and both
CRAs always report . If the issuer buys no reports, its pro…t is  0.42 If the issuer buys
one report its pro…t is
2
 ¡ min[12]
If the issuer buys two reports, it gets
2
 ¡ (1 + 2)
The issuer thus prefers two  reports to one when
2(
 ¡ 
) ¸  = 12
If each CRA sets its fee  equal to 2(  ¡ ), the issuer is willing to buy both reports












42As in the monopoly case, we will restrict o¤ the equilibrium path beliefs to be the ex-ante beliefs.
28This condition is satis…ed by assumption A4. These fees yield pro…ts
2(
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Note that there can’t be an equilibrium where both CRAs set higher fees of 2  ¡  0
such that the issuer would only want to purchase a single  report. Indeed, since the reports
are homogeneous goods, each CRA would pro…t by deviating and lowering its price as in
Bertrand competition, eliminating this possible equilibrium. Also, note that a deviation
from the equilibrium by …rm  of  = 2  ¡  0 isn’t a pro…table deviation from the
equilibrium by assumption A4, which guarantees that this deviation total fee is larger than
2( ¡ ), so that the issuer simply wouldn’t pay the high fee. Furthermore, a deviation
by a CRA intending to tell the truth would not be pro…table: if the fee for truthtelling is less
than 2(  ¡  ), it is not pro…table, and if the fee is more than 2(  ¡  ), since
we know that ratings in‡ation is feasible (2(  ¡  )  ) the CRA who attempts
to deviate will not tell the truth.
Now assume that both CRAs rate the investment truthfully. If the CRAs set their fees






since 2( ¡ ) is the maximum fee that makes the issuer prefer two reports rather than
one, and since  is the upper bound of the truthtelling constraint. When there are two
 reports, Assumption A4 implies that the issuer prefers to purchase two reports to none.43
When there is a  report and a  report, assumption A4 also tells us that the issuer will
purchase the  report.
When both CRAs are hired, a CRA may want to deviate by setting high fees  =
2  ¡  0 and always report  to earn rents when the other CRA truthfully issues a 
report. This deviation is ruled out by assumption A5.
Finally, if 2(  ¡  )   then deviating to a fee of 2(  ¡  ) and always
reporting  is pro…table for a CRA. This sets a boundary on the parameters for which
truthtelling can be an equilibrium.
There cannot be an equilibrium where CRA  reveals truthfully and CRA ¡ always
reports . If this was an equilibrium, we would need    and ¡  . However,
CRA  has a pro…table deviation to set  = ¡ ¡  and always report . For the same
reason, there can’t be an equilibrium where the issuer only purchases one report since any
fee that CRA ¡ would set would be undercut by a deviating CRA . ¥
Proposition 3 Given Assumptions A0-A6, a truthtelling monopoly strictly dominates
a truthtelling duopoly.
Proof: Total Surplus with a truthtelling duopoly depends on how large the fraction of
trusting investors is; that is, what interval  is in: [  0
2   
 0 ] or [ 
 0 1].
In the …rst interval, total surplus 1 given by equation 4 is increasing in 


1 = (1 ¡ )(2 ¡ 2 + 2(1 ¡ ) ¡ 2)
43Since no reports purchased is now on the equilibrium path, the issuer would get a return of
max[ 0 ] if it purchased no reports. Given that max[ 0 ]   0, it is easy to see that the
statement holds.
29And in the second interval, total surplus 2 given by equation 5 has a larger positive
slope than in the …rst interval.
Total surplus in the …rst interval is larger than in the second for all  except at the top






2 + (1 ¡ )
2)
 + 2(1 ¡ )(
0 +  ¡ )
at their maximum point of  = 1.
In sum, the composite total surplus curve increases in the …rst interval and jumps down
and increases in the second interval.
Total Surplus with a truthtelling monopoly also depends on what interval  is in: [  0




Over the …rst interval total surplus is independent of  (see equation 2), while over the
second interval it jumps down and is increasing (see equation 3).
We compare …rst 1 and 1: When  = 0, the di¤erence in total surpluses is:





[( ¡ (1 ¡ ))( ¡ ) + (1 ¡ )2(
0 +  ¡ )]]
¡[(






2 ¡ (1 ¡ )
2)( ¡ ) + (1 ¡ )
2(
0 +  ¡ )
= 2(1 ¡ )
0 + (1 ¡ )(
0 +  ¡ )
= (1 ¡ )(3
0 +  ¡ )
This expression is positive since 2 0 +  ¡  =   +    0.
When  = 1, the di¤erence in total surpluses is:









2 ¡ (1 ¡ )
2)( ¡ )
+(2(1 ¡ ) + (1 ¡ )
2)(




[( ¡ (1 ¡ ))( ¡ ) + (1 ¡ )2(




( ¡ (1 ¡ ))( ¡ ) + (1 ¡ )(1 + )(
0 +  ¡ )]
= ¡(1 ¡ )(
0 +  ¡ )
This expression is again positive as  0 +  ¡   0 by A3.
As we have already shown,
1( = 1) = 2( = 1)
and
1( = 0)  2( = 0)
30And since both are linearly increasing in , the argument above implies that 1  2.
Lastly, we must examine whether 2 and 2 can cross. We know that
2( = 1)  2( = 1)
(since 1( = 1) = 2( = 1) and also since 1( = 1) = 2( = 1)).
Furthermore, we can establish that 2( = 0)  2( = 0):









2(2 ¡  ¡ ) + (1 ¡ )
2(2(1 ¡ ) ¡  ¡ )]
= (1 ¡ )(2
0 +  ¡ )  0
Given that both 2 and 2 increase linearly in , they cannot cross. This estab-
lishes the proof. ¥
Lemma 3 Total surplus for a truthtelling duopoly is larger than when there is a monopoly
CRA who in‡ates ratings.
Proof: The total surplus when two CRAs report truthfully given in equation 5 (2)
is less than or equal to 1 for all . We therefore compare this expression to the total
surplus when one CRA always reports , which is given by equation 1.
First, total surplus when the two CRAs report truthfully and  = 0 can be written as:




2(2 ¡ 2) + (1 ¡ )
2(2(1 ¡ ) ¡ 2) + (
2 ¡ (1 ¡ )
2)( ¡ )]  0
while total surplus when both CRAs always report  and  = 0 is equal to zero.
Both total surpluses are increasing linearly in  since







2( ¡ ) + 






 = ( ¡ ) + ((1 ¡ ) ¡ )
are both positive.
Finally, when  = 1, the di¤erence between the total surpluses is:







2 ¡ (1 ¡ )













2 ¡ (1 ¡ )





which is larger than zero by A3 and  ¸ 1
2. This completes the proof. ¥
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